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The Crisis
Despite the frequency and consequences of do-
mestic violence, current responses to the problem are
ineffective.  Scholars widely agree that institutions ded-
icated to addressing family violence are over-burdened
and under-funded.1 Mandatory arrest and prosecution
policies deprive police officers and prosecutors of the
ability to individualize their responses to domestic vio-
lence situations in order to most effectively prevent fu-
ture incidents of violence.2 Batterer’s treatment
programs suffer from time constraints,
and the limited information available on
their long-term results indicates that
they are often insufficient to meet the
long-term needs of families.3 Addition-
ally, the dropout rates in these programs
tend to be high.4 While researchers dif-
fer as to solutions, they agree that the
problems with the systems that address
domestic violence are complex.5
The statistics are startling.
Women are significantly more likely
than men to report being raped, physi-
cally assaulted and/or stalked by a cur-
rent or former intimate partner, whether the time frame
is a lifetime or the previous twelve months.6 One out of
every five women in the united States has been physi-
cally assaulted by an intimate partner, compared with
one out of every fourteen men in the united States.7 Vi-
olence against women is predominantly intimate partner
violence.  Sixty-four percent of the women who were
raped, physically assaulted and/or stalked since age
eighteen were victimized by a current or former hus-
band, cohabitating partner, boyfriend, or date.8
In 2005, the unites States Department of Justice
published a compendium of the most recent family vio-
lence statistics from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, and
two databases maintained by the FBI.9 While the study
maintains that family violence rates fell between 1993
and 2002, forty-nine percent of violent crimes commit-
ted against a family member between 1998 and 2002 
were committed against a spouse.10 Seventy-three per-
cent of family violence victims between 1998 and 2002
were females.11 This study also reviewed inmates in 
local jails in 2002 and found that twenty-two percent of
the population had been convicted of a crime of family
violence.12 Their victims were mostly female (seventy-
nine percent).13
Children are also affected by domestic violence
in their homes.  each year, an estimated 3.3 million chil-
dren are exposed to domestic violence acts.14 Although
most victims try to hide the abuse from their children,
one study found that children are present in almost half
of all battery incidents.15 Children who are victimized,
by watching intimate partner abuse of
parents, are likely to later become vic-
tims again later in life, or become per-
petrators, themselves.16 Battered
women are six times more likely to
have witnessed violence as children.17
Similarly, batterers are ten times more
likely to have witnessed domestic vio-
lence as children.18 In addition, chil-
dren growing up in violent homes are
at greater risk for depression, anxiety,
school problems, running away from
home, teenage pregnancy, substance
abuse, and attempted suicide.19
Domestic violence not only affects the assaulted
women and their children; it affects us all.20 Domestic
violence results in worker loss of productivity, turnover,
absenteeism, and excessive use of medical benefits,
costing American businesses four billion dollars each
year.21 In light of the pervasiveness and impact of phys-
ical assault by intimate partners, domestic violence
should be treated as a chief criminal justice and public
health concern.22
The History of Domestic Violence Law in the
United States: Looking the Other Way
The American legal systems have a long history
of complicity in intimate abuse, where the abuse was
perpetrated by men against their wives and children.23
From the early colonial period onward, American courts
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followed British common law in allowing husbands the
right of domestic abuse.24 It was not until the late nine-
teenth century that states finally began to move away
from actually condoning a man’s use of physical force
against his wife.25 however, many states still clung to
the position that in the absence of serious violence, the
government should not interfere in the private family
realm.26 See further discussion on the history of domes-
tic violence law infra.
The domestic violence movement came into
being by the late 1960s and early 1970s, and reformers
made substantial improvements in statutory law.27 Once
the laws were in place, a campaign was put in place to
make certain the laws were properly enforced, and
around the 1970s, advocates began demanding that law
enforcement officials “treat domestic violence like any
other crime.”28 For example, police officers often ig-
nored domestic violence calls or delayed responding to
the calls.29 In response, battered women’s advocates
successfully advocated in the 1980s for mandatory ar-
rest policies.  These policies frustrated the common po-
lice practice of failing to make an arrest in cases of
domestic violence.30
Domestic Violence Law in the United States Today: 
“One Size Fits All”
The 1960s and 1970s were  periods of reform,
but some of the policies and programs that have grown
out of those reforms have proven ineffective or even
counter-productive at addressing domestic violence.
The tendency of both mandatory arrest and prosecution
policies and batterer’s treatment programs is to respond
identically in all domestic violence situations.  This can
be frustrating for police, prosecutors, and perhaps most
of all, victims, all of whom know that each case is
unique. 
Indeed, mandatory arrests and prosecutions do
not always have positive results.31 Some research sug-
gests that mandatory arrests may actually increase vio-
lence.32 Further, when prosecutors force victims to
participate in prosecutions against their will, it may af-
fect the victims’ safety and autonomy.33 Current re-
search suggests that mandatory arrest and prosecution
policies are not successful crime reduction strategies be-
cause these policies eliminate the professionals’ discre-
tion and the victims’ desires from the state’s
decision-making process.34
In sum, mandatory arrest and prosecution poli-
cies treat each incident and each batterer as meriting an
equivalent response, and thus these policies fail to take
the unique circumstances of each family into account.
Without taking the disposition of a particular batterer or
victim into account, however, police officers and pros-
ecutors cannot ascertain the response that will be least
likely to provoke more violence.  See further discussion
of the problems with mandatory arrest and prosecution
policies infra Parts II and IV.
The effectiveness of batterer’s treatment pro-
grams is questionable.  unfortunately, the programs
often do not address the causes and effects of domestic
violence.  Despite the fact that many batterers use drugs
or alcohol on the day of assault, and many have prior
arrests related to substance abuse, addiction is rarely
dealt with in batterer’s treatment programs.35
The “one size fits all” approach to batterer’s
treatment programs (particularly in California, where all
persons convicted of a crime of family violence are re-
quired to participate in a fifty-two week program)36 fails
to allow for the fact that each family situation and each
batterer is different.  By ignoring the specific causes and
effects of domestic violence incidents and instead met-
ing out a standard program designed to reach all pro-
gram participants, everyone loses. See further
discussion of the problems with batterer’s treatment pro-
grams infra Part VI.
A Call for Change: Police and Prosecutorial Discre-
tion, and Restorative Justice
The “one size fits all” response to domestic vio-
lence is not working, and consequently the united States
needs to implement a policy change.  First, police offi-
cers should be allowed to exercise some discretion at
the scene of a domestic violence call.  See infra Part III.
Second, prosecutors should be allowed to use non-co-
ercive no-drop policies and to use their professional dis-
cretion in deciding which cases to prosecute and the
manner and level they should be prosecuted.  See infra
Part V.  Third, restorative justice models should be im-
plemented to deal with domestic violence when appro-
priate.  See infra Part VII.
Pre-1980s United States: Arrest as a Last Resort in
Domestic Violence Cases
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Part I 
Part II - Problem: Mandatory Arrest Policies
An estimated two million American women are
victims/survivors of domestic violence at the hands of
their male partners.37 historically, domestic violence
was often ignored by law enforcement.  united States
police rarely made arrests in cases of misdemeanor do-
mestic violence.38
“As recently as 1967, the leading police profes-
sional organization, the International Association of
Chiefs of Police, declared in its training manual that ‘in
dealing with family disputes, the power of arrest should
be exercised as a last resort.’”39 Law enforcement
viewed domestic violence as a private matter.  “This po-
sition was endorsed by the American Bar Association,
whose 1973 Standards for the Urban Police Function
said that police should ‘engage in the resolution of con-
flict such as that which occurs between husband and
wife . . . in the highly populated sections of the large
city, without reliance upon criminal assault or disorderly
conduct statutes.’”40 Generally, police agencies believed
that in a family dispute, an arrest did not resolve the big-
ger problems and could aggravate matters, because the
husband could seek retribution when released.41
Mandatory Arrest Policies
In the 1980s, mandatory and preferred arrest po-
lices became the favored law enforcement responses to
domestic violence calls for service.42 These policies re-
quire an officer to arrest a suspect if there is probable
cause to believe that an assault or battery has occurred,
regardless of the victim’s wishes.43 In 1982, five states
had mandatory arrest statutes, and that number increased
to twenty-one states and the District of Columbia by
1994.44 Today, all states and the District of Columbia
permit warrantless arrest in certain circumstances, and
most also allow mandatory or preferential arrest.45
Sherman and Berk’s Experiment
Mandatory and preferred arrest policies were in-
spired in part by a Minneapolis experiment done by
Lawrence W. Sherman and Richard A. Berk from 1981
to 1982.46 In their study, 314 couples were randomly as-
signed one of three domestic violence responses: advis-
ing the couple, separating the couple by ordering the
offender to leave for 8 hours, or arresting the offender.47
They interviewed victims every two weeks following
the intervention.48 Official records showed that six
months after police responded to misdemeanor domestic
violence, ten percent of those arrested, nineteen percent
of those advised, and twenty-four percent of those re-
moved from the scene had subsequently repeated their
violence.49 Sherman and Berk concluded that arrest was
the most effective means of preventing batterers from
becoming violent again.50
Despite their conclusions, the authors actually
recommended three policies.  First, all states should
change their laws to allow warrantless arrests for mis-
demeanor domestic violence.  Second, police depart-
ments should adopt pro-arrest policies allowing officers
to retain some discretion and the victim to retain some
input into the charging decision.  Third, the Minneapolis
experiment should be replicated in other cities.51 Al-
though Sherman and Berk recommended all three meas-
ures, “[their] findings resulted in a great deal of attention
nationwide and led to the establishment of mandatory
arrest policies throughout the country.”52 The federal
government encouraged this by providing federal funds
to jurisdictions that adopted stringent domestic violence
policies.53
Tracy Thurman: Sues the Police
Policy changes may also have been partly a re-
sult of highly publicized jury verdicts against police de-
partments that failed to make arrests in cases of
domestic violence.54 In 1984, Tracy Thurman was
awarded 2.9 million dollars after suing the police de-
partment of Torrington, Connecticut and twenty-four
city police officers.  Thurman argued that the city’s pol-
icy and practice of nonintervention and non-arrest was
unconstitutional.55 Thurman’s estranged husband was
on probation for breaking the windshield of her car
while she was inside of it.  he violated the protective
order on many previous occasions, but he was never ar-
rested.  On June 10, 1983 Thurman called the police, but
by the time they arrived she had been stabbed numerous
times.56
The National Institute of Justice Experiments
From 1985 to 1990, the national Institute for
Justice funded six police replication experiments, of
which five were published.57 These experiments were
conducted in Omaha, nebraska; Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
Colorado Springs, Colorado; Metro-Dade, Florida; and
Charlotte, north Carolina to determine the deterrent
value of three different police responses to domestic vi-
olence: arrest of the abuser, mediation between the par-
ties, and physical separation of the parties.58 Many
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researchers argue that the results of the published studies
indicate that mandatory arrest may actually increase the
incidence of violence in some women’s lives.59 Oppo-
nents maintain that arrest is generally the superior
method of deterring future violence, and they also some-
times claim that studies showing otherwise are fatally
flawed.60
The Milwaukee experiment was conducted in
1992 by Sherman and his associates to examine the ef-
fects of arrest on batterers in that city.61 The study in-
cluded 1,200 cases.62 They found that arrests had a
short-term deterrent effect.63 Over the long term, how-
ever, violence increased in some cases in which the per-
petrator had been arrested.64 Sherman and his associates
concluded that there is no overall long-term deterrence
from arrest.65 Thus, the Milwaukee ex-
periment is strong evidence that arrest
has different effects on different kinds of
people.  The results of the study also
showed that employed, married, high
school graduate, and white suspects are
all less likely to have any repeat violence
than unemployed, unmarried, high
school dropout, and black suspects.66
The Charlotte experiment was
conducted by J. David hirschel and Ira
W. hutchison, III from 1987 through
1989.67 It compared the rate of recidi-
vism of 650 offenders who received
three different responses from law en-
forcement: advise and separation, is-
suance of a citation to appear in court,
and arrest at the scene.68 hirschel and hutchison con-
cluded that arrest is not a significant deterrent to misde-
meanor spouse assault; however, it may still be the
conscionable choice versus non-arrest.69
The Omaha replication, conducted by Franklyn
W. Dunford and his colleagues,70 began in early 1986
and studied 327 suspects.71 In cases of misdemeanor
spousal violence, suspects were either arrested, sepa-
rated, or mediated.72 The authors claimed that no treat-
ment proved more successful than any other.73
The Colorado Springs experiment, conducted by
Richard A. Berk, began in 1987 and lasted about two
years.74 1,658 persons suspected of misdemeanor
spousal violence were assigned to one of four treat-
ments; an emergency protective order with arrest, an
emergency protective order coupled with crisis counsel-
ing, an emergency protective order only, or a simple
restoration of order at the scene.75 Berk concluded that
arrest did not deter unemployed batterers, and that arrest
can sometimes actually make things worse.76
The Metro-Dade experiment was conducted by
Antony M. Pate and edwin e. hamilton77 from 1987
through 1989.78 The Metro-Dade Police Department se-
lected 907 cases in which officers would have the dis-
cretionary authority to either arrest or not where
probable cause existed to arrest for misdemeanor
spousal battery.79 The researchers found results similar
to those found in the Colorado Springs experiment with
regard to unemployed batterers, in that arrest only mar-
ginally affected recidivism after six months.80
Overall, these studies point to the benefits of an
individualized intervention strategies over a “one size
fits all” approach.81 Additionally, the studies indicate
that mandatory arrest is likely to be a
deterrent only for men who have
something to lose from arrest.82 Fi-
nally, the studies suggest that manda-
tory arrest laws should be
implemented with regard to the char-
acteristics of the jurisdiction.  For ex-
ample, in a geographic area where
unemployment is prevalent, manda-
tory arrest might actually lead to
more incidents of domestic violence
among the poor.83 Critics of these
studies thus maintain that mandatory
arrest statutes should be implemented
in tandem with coordinated efforts
like the Duluth model.84 See infra
next section in Part II.
The Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project
(DAIP)
The Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Proj-
ect (“DAIP”), which began in 1981, made Duluth, Min-
nesota the first jurisdiction to enact a mandatory arrest
policy for misdemeanor assaults.85 DAIP utilized
mandatory arrest policies, police training, prosecutorial
and judicial guidelines, support services for victims, and
counseling for batterers.86 The program was successful
in that “77 percent of those arrested for misdemeanor
crimes of domestic violence pled guilty, and repeat of-
fenses dropped significantly.”87 The Duluth Project
points us in the direction of discretion as well as a coor-
dinated community response.  It also indicates that any
coordinated community response must include address-
ing the issue of unemployment.
6 Criminal Law Brief
The results of the 
[Milwaukee experi-
ment] also showed that
employed, married, high
school graduate, and
white suspects are all
less likely to have any




The idea that all cases should be treated alike ig-
nores the fact that every criminal case is different.
every family has different circumstances.  If a victim
does not want her partner arrested, a police officer
should be able to take the victim’s position, and the myr
iad reasons for it, into consideration.  A victim may be
dependant on her batterer financially, she may have im-
migration concerns, and/or she may hope that police in-
tervention will send a message or possibly diffuse an
escalating situation.  While mandatory arrest policies
force the police to treat the crime of domestic violence
seriously, the fact that a police officer cannot take a vic-
tim’s concerns into consideration may serve to disem-
power the victim by eliminating her choices. 
Sherman and his colleagues have suggested a
policy that would allow officers to retain a number of
options at the scene of a potential domestic violence ar-
rest.88 For example, they should be able to provide the
victim with transportation to a shelter, offer transporta-
tion to a detox center for the offender, or grant the victim
the option to decide if an arrest should be made with
suggested options for future safety.89 Sherman advo-
cates for a more “victim-directed” arrest that would
allow the person who is more directly affected by the
decision to determine whether or not an arrest is bene-
ficial.90
While it is clear that too little state intervention
can be detrimental to the safety of victims, too much in-
tervention in the form of mandatory arrest may intrude
on the autonomy of victims in a way that calls these
policies into question.  A pro-arrest or preferred arrest
policy may be the answer.  “Allowing officers some dis-
cretion would provide consequences for batterers as well
as protection for women who do not want their partners
arrested.”91 Clearly there are cases, however, where
even if the victim does not want the batterer arrested,
officers should evaluate the community’s interest in
safety, and make the arrest when safety outweighs the
concerns of the victim.92 While the pro-arrest policy de-
livers the message to the officer that arrest is the pre-
ferred response, it also allows the officer to use
discretion in the situation where arrest may actually fur-
ther endanger the victim.93
As a prosecutor of domestic violence crimes, I
commonly hear police officers complain about the frus-
tration of returning to the same residences over and over
again.  It is frustrating to them that even with mandatory
arrest policies and mandatory programs, recidivism re-
mains high.  This frustration often translates into apathy
and lack of empathy for the victim.  If officers were al-
lowed to exercise discretion at the scene of the arrest
and participate in restorative justice programs,94 this
might reduce burnout and give them a sense of purpose
and accomplishment.  They would be able to participate
in not only the punishment of the offender but the reha-
bilitation as well.
Prosecutors have different responsibilities and
roles.  Generally a prosecutor is primarily responsible
to the interests of society as a whole; however the
prosecutor must also protect the interest of victims.95
ABA Standard 3-3.2(h) states, “Where practical, the
prosecutor should seek to insure that victims of serious
crimes or their representatives are given an opportu-
nity to consult with and to provide information to the
prosecution prior to the decision of whether or not to
prosecute.”96 ABA Standard 3-3.9 (b)(v) lists the re-
luctance of a victim to testify as valid reason for a
prosecutor to exercise discretion not to prosecute a
case.97 Prosecutors are also faced with the reality that
victims of domestic violence crimes are in greater
need of protection because they are at greater risk of
future abuse due to their relationships with the perpe-
trators.98
Mandatory Prosecution Policies,
or “No Drop” Policies
Following the development of mandatory arrest
policies, prosecutor’s offices began to develop manda-
tory, or “no drop,” policies.  These policies encourage
prosecutors to pursue domestic violence cases regardless
of battered women’s wishes.99 It became common prac-
tice for prosecutors to prosecute cases without the vic-
tims.  Developments in various penal and evidentiary
codes allow prosecutors to present a victim’s statements
made at the time of the incident through the testimony
of other witnesses, generally police officers.  Recently,
a landmark united States Supreme Court case, Craw-
ford v. Washington, has frustrated prosecutors’ efforts to
present victims’ statements through other witnesses.100
A survey, conducted by Donald R. Rebovich and     
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Part III - Solution: Discrestion for Police Officers
at Arrest
Part IV - Problem: Mandatory Prosecution Poli-
cies, A Prosecutor’s Duty to a Victim
published in 1996, found that two-thirds of all prosecu-
tion offices had adopted no-drop policies.101 The survey
suggests that larger jurisdictions are more likely to pros-
ecute without the victim’s cooperation, while smaller ju-
risdictions still need the victim’s testimony.102
Consequently, the outcome of a case could be deter-
mined by the degree to which a prosecution office were
willing to either force or encourage a woman to tes-
tify.103A second study, conducted by D. Ford and M.J.
Regoli in 1992, analyzed the relationship between pros-
ecution policies and rates of recidivism.104 They used
official records and victim interviews to compare out-
comes in 678 cases under four different prosecutorial
tracks, including no-drop and drop-permitted policies.105
The study found that in cases where some type of pros-
ecutorial action was taken, the risk of re-abuse de-
creased by 50%.106 Ford and Regoli concluded that the
“victim[s] who chose to prosecute derived a kind of per-
sonal power from this decision.”107
In 1998, Davis, Smith, and nickles published
their findings from reviewing more than  one thousand
cases of domestic violence misdemeanors.108 They con-
cluded that prosecuting the batterer “had no effect on
the likelihood of rearrest . . . within a six-month pe-
riod.”109 In a second, smaller study, published in 2000,
McFarlane, Willson, Lemmey, and Malecha found that
whether the police arrested the suspect or the prosecutor
accepted the case made no difference in the amount of
violence reported at the time the victim filed charges or
in the months that followed.110
Prosecutors should be able to use their discretion
to consider victims’ wishes in prosecuting domestic vi-
olence for several reasons.  First, ABA Standard 3-3.9
(b)(v) lists the reluctance of a victim to testify as valid
reason for a prosecutor to exercise discretion not to pros-
ecute a case.111 Second, a prosecutor has a duty to con-
sider the safety interests of a victim in a domestic
violence case because she is likely to be victimized
again in the future.112 Third, when a victim wants her
case dropped, her concerns coincide with the pragmatic
concerns of scant prosecutorial resources and judicial
efficiency.113 Prosecution offices should use non-coer-
cive polices that balance crime control and the victims’
interests.
Over the past ten years, I have witnessed the
varying approaches of many prosecutors to mandatory
prosecution policies with regard to domestic violence
crimes.  no matter what the approach, it is clear that,
like police officers, prosecutors face frustration and
burnout, which can translate into a variety of abuses
against victims.  Some prosecutors choose to simply ig-
nore the victim and move ahead with the prosecution of
the case, looking at statistics, and ignoring what desires
or feelings the victim may have with regard to the pros-
ecution of the case.  Others, carry out their role by
adopting demeaning attitudes that only further victimize
the victim.  If prosecutors were given discretion as to
which cases should be prosecuted, and the opportunity
to participate in the rehabilitation of offenders through
the restorative justice process, see infra Part VII, this
might eliminate some of the problems associated with
the frustration and burnout of prosecutors.  
It is not uncommon for courts to require that
upon batterers’ convictions, they attend batterer’s treat-
ment programs, also referred to as batterer’s intervention
programs.  In the united States by 1997, seventeen
states had mandatory standards to regulate the process
of working with domestic violence offenders in bat-
terer’s treatment programs.114 By 2001, twenty-four
states had implemented mandatory guidelines for bat-
terer’s treatment programs to follow, and twelve more
states were in the process of developing such guide-
lines.115
In California, convicted batterers must attend a
fifty-two week batterer’s treatment program pursuant to
California Penal Code section 1203.097.116 In many ju-
risdictions in California, there are specialized courts for
domestic violence cases.  In these courts, “[d]efendants
. . . return to court regularly for compliance reviews be-
fore the domestic violence judge, and failures to comply
with court orders result in swiftly imposed sanctions.”117
As a sanction, the court may order a defendant to come
to court more frequently, to do community service work,
or possibly to be incarcerated.118
The Duluth Model
Many batterer’s treatment programs follow the
Duluth Model, which follows a “psycho-educational
and skills building curriculum.”119 The curriculum fo-
cuses on changing the batterer’s “ideology on power and
Part V - Solution: Prosecutorial Discretion
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Part VI - Problem: Batterer’s Treatment Programs
The Popularity of Batterer’s Treatment Programs
Around the Country
control,” and also includes discussions about relation-
ships between men and women.120 Many of the pro-
grams are taught by two people, a man and a woman
who model a healthy and respectful relationship.121 Gen-
erally, these programs use similar procedures, which in-
clude “intake and assessment, victim contact,
orientation, group treatment, leaving the program, and
completion.”122
“One Size Fits All:” No Substance Abuse Compo-
nent to Batterer’s Treatment Programs
Despite the fact that “some research suggests
that different types of batterers may respond differently
to existing programs,”123 batterer’s treatment programs
tend to take a “one size fits all” approach toward domes-
tic violence, which results in certain offenders lacking
the rehabilitiative services that they
need.  For example, most batterer’s
treatment programs do not have a sub-
stance abuse component,124 even de-
spite the close connection between
domestic violence and substance abuse.
One study found that ninety-two per-
cent of domestic violence perpetrators
had used alcohol or drugs on the day of
the assault and seventy-two percent had
a record of prior arrests related to substance use.125
The Effectiveness of Batterer’s Treatment Pro-
grams at Stopping Physical Violence: Problems
with Program Monitoring and Reporting
The goal of batterer’s treatment programs should
be to stop domestic violence.  One of the only ways to
determine whether or not the physical violence has
stopped after a batterer has entered into and/or com-
pleted a treatment program is to obtain information from
the victim.  however, using victims as a source of in-
formation can skew results because victims may have
many reasons to give false information.  Many programs
rely on self-reporting as well as victim reporting, which
obviously has the potential for skewed results.126 Addi-
tionally, many of the manipulative and controlling be-
haviors may continue, even when the physical violence
may have stopped.127 not much is required to graduate
from the program.  If the batterer attends, pays, and at
least appears to remain violence-free, he or she is likely
to graduate.128
Thus, batterer’s treatment programs are largely
untested and often not properly monitored.  In Califor-
nia, for example,  the courts must rely on information
from the service providers it utilizes in order to monitor
compliance.129 The quality of the program operations
and reporting is critical to this component.130 While the
court can easily determine if it is receiving sufficient in-
formation regarding a defendant’s attendance and par-
ticipation, it is difficult for the court to monitor the
performance of the program.
The  Effectiveness of Batterer’s Treatment Pro-
grams at Stopping Physical Violence: Other Studies
Very little in-depth research about the success of
batterer’s treatment programs exists.131 What research
has been done is inconclusive and controversial,132 and
indeed, “[m]ost studies define cessation of physical
abuse as the primary criterion for judg-
ing effectiveness of efforts . . . [while
others] consider reduction of violent be-
havior a success.”133 In either event, be-
cause the victim or the offender is
generally the one reporting the cessa-
tion or reduction of the violent behav-
ior, batterer’s treatment programs’
reported rates of success are subject to
suspicion.134 That said, researchers
have studied the effectiveness of batterer’s treatment
programs, and their results provide insight into these
programs’ capacity to prevent violence.
Studies conducted by Richard M. Tolman and
Jeffrey L. edleson in 1989 and 1990 found that based
on victim reporting, fifty-three to eighty-five percent of
domestic violence offenders stopped their physically
abusive behavior after they completed a batterer’s treat-
ment program.135 however, another study completed by
Feld and Straus in 1990, revealed that in the general
population, there were also high rates of cessation of
physical abuse, even though there had been no formal
intervention.136
In 1991, Adele harrell conducted a study and
concluded that batterers who completed short-term
court-mandated groups were as likely to commit subse-
quent physical abuse as men who were found guilty by
the court but were not mandated to treatment.137 In her
study she not only evaluated physical abuse and threats
of violence, but also considered psychological abuse,
conflict resolution skill, beliefs about spousal abuse, and
the victims perceived safety.138
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The  Effectiveness of Batterer’s Treatment Pro-
grams at Stopping Physical Violence: Conclusion
The evidence that appears to be favorable for
batterer’s treatment programs should be viewed with
caution due to the methodological shortcomings in the
studies that are currently available.139 For example, suc-
cess is reported with lower percentages in programs
where the follow-up is longer and where victims were
relied upon for reports versus where police records of
re-arrest were relied upon for reports.140
The bottom line when it comes to batterer’s
treatment programs is that no approach has clearly
proven successful in reducing long-term battering be-
havior.141 It remains unclear whether treatment reduces
physical abuse.
Introduction to Restorative Justice
Restorative justice involves “restoring victims,
restoring offenders, and resetoring communities,”142 and
thus justice realized through “those who have a ‘stake
in a particular offense.”143 Family violence is not elim-
inated from the criminal justice system with the use of
the restorative justice processes.  use of these processes
in conjunction with the criminal justice system can bet-
ter serve victims as well as the community.  Violence in
a familial setting is complex, and often presents risks
due to the imbalance of power inherent within families,
as well as the potential for future violence.144 These is-
sues, however, can be dealt with and addressed through
the process.  Although acceptance of restorative justice
models has grown rapidly, the complex nature of family
violence has resulted in a limited application of restora-
tive justice to family violence.145 however, there are a
number of restorative justice models, and this paper
serves to promote the use of restorative justice models
in conjunction with formal legal intervention.  Prosecu-
tors and judicial officers should be able to incorporate
restorative justice programs into the resolution of ap-
propriate cases.
The History of Restorative Justice
Restorative justice has been a model of criminal
justice throughout most of human history.  It is
grounded in traditions of justice from the ancient Arab,
Greek, and Roman civilizations.146 The norman Con-
quest of europe at the end of the Dark Ages saw a move
away from these principles and the transformation of
crime into a felony against the king instead of a wrong
done to another person.147 Beginning in 1200, european
princes began to centralize criminal justice and, in turn,
demolished the restorative justice of local communities
and churches.148 The crown used public torture of felons
to inspire compliance in their subjects.149 The result of
this public punishment was high crime rates by modern
standards.150 Two things occurred from the time of the
rise of napoleon to World War II which seemed to have
an effect on crime reduction: the rise of the reintegrative
welfare state and the development of professional police
forces.151
From 1820 to 1970, punishment of all kinds de-
clined in the West, corporal punishment disappeared,
and capital punishment disappeared as a public specta-
cle.152 In the 1970s, the term restorative justice was used
to describe one-on-one mediation programs between the
victim and the offender with a professional mediator
present.153 Restorative justice became a global social
movement in the 1990s as a result of examples of in-
digenous practice from the oral justice traditions of the
new Zealand Maori and north American native peo-
ples.154 Since 1995, thousands of people have been
trained in restorative justice “conferencing” by two or-
ganizations in particular: Ted Wachtel’s Real Justice in
the united States and John MacDonald’s Transforma-
tive Justice in Australia.155
Today in the international arena, restorative jus-
tice principles are being used to address human rights
violations in the context of truth commissions.  These
principles were applied in Argentina after the country’s
defeat in the Falklands Islands war and in Brazil, Chile
and el Salvador.  The South African Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission (“TRC”) is perhaps the most suc-
cessful example of a Truth Commission which
employed restorative justice ideals to date.  It “was es-
tablished to uncover the truth about past violations of
human rights to enable the process of reconciliation . .
. . ”156
The aims of the TRC were. . . to produce a
record of the violations of the past and
make recommendations to prevent them
from ever happening again; to acknowl-
edge the suffering of the victims and to as-
sist in the rehabilitation of those victims; to
offer amnesty to past perpetrators; and to
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facilitate healing and reconciliation for the
nation.157
The founders of the TRC examined the suc-
cesses and failures of the more than twenty truth com-
missions used worldwide prior to its formulation.
Restorative justice is developing in many parts
of the world.  “The united nations, the Council of eu-
rope, and the european union have been addressing
restorative justice for a number of years.”158 In 2000,
the united nations Congress on Crime Prevention de-
veloped a draft proposal for un Basic Principles on the
use of Restorative Justice Programs in Criminal Mat-
ters.  This proposal was adopted by the united nations
in 2002.159 The policy calls for member nations of the
european union to promote mediation in criminal cases
and integrate this practice into their laws by 2006.160
More recently in the united States, as early as
the 1970’s, experimental programs have incorporated
restorative justice programs into the criminal justice sys-
tem.  In the late 1970s in elkhart, Indiana a program
known as Victim Offender Reconciliation program
(“VORP”) was developed.  The program stemmed from
a case in elmira, Ontario in which two young men van-
dalized twenty-two properties.  Members of the proba-
tion department and the community suggested to the
judge that the offenders meet with their victims.161
Today, although the approaches and names vary, there
are numerous programs in the united States using vic-
tim-offender mediation as an element of resolution in
criminal matters.  The Department of Justice, Office of
Justice Programs estimates that there are more than 300
programs in the united States and more than 700 in eu-
rope.162
Through the mid-1980s, in many jurisdictions
restorative justice initiatives remained small in size and
number, and few justice officials viewed these program
as credible.163 In 1994, the American Bar Association
(“ABA”) endorsed victim-offender mediation.  The
ABA recommended the use of victim-offender media-
tion throughout the country and provided guidelines for
its use and implementation.164 In 1995, the national Or-
ganization for Victim Assistance also approved the use
of restorative justice when it published a document en-
titled, “Restorative Community Justice: A Call to Ac-
tion”.165
Defining Restorative Justice
Restorative justice is commonly defined as “a
process whereby parties with a stake in a specific of-
fence collectively resolve how to deal with the aftermath
of the offense and its implications for the future.”166
howard Zehr defines it as “a process to involve, to the
extent possible, those who have a stake in a specific of-
fense and to collectively identify and address harms,
needs, and obligations, in order to heal and put things
as right as possible.”167 Restorative justice is a social
movement that taps into cynicism about the capacity of
state institutions to solve problems like crime.  It de-
mands that law and order politicians to produce evi-
dence that the tax dollars spent on building prisons
actually prevent crime.168 “Restorative justice is not a
specific program or set of programs; it is a way of think-
ing about responding to the problem of crime, a set of
values that guides decisions on policy, programs and
practice.”169 It requires a different way of viewing, un-
derstanding and responding to crime.170 It offers a way
of transforming the entire legal system, while also im-
pacting family life, workplace behavior, and even polit-
ical conduct.171
Instead of focusing upon the weaknesses
or defecits of offenders and crime victims,
restorative justice attempts to draw upon
the strengths of these individuals and their
capacity to openly address the need to re-
pair the harm caused.  Restorative justice
denounces criminal behavior yet empha-
sizes the need to treat offenders with re-
spect and to reintegrate them into the
larger community in ways that can lead to
lawful behavior.172
Restorative justice is generally viewed in two
ways: one is known as process conception and the other
is a value conception.173 Generally, the process concep-
tion view is more widely used and accepted.  The
process conception view of restorative justice brings to-
gether all of the stakeholders affected by some harm to
disscuss how they have been affected and come to an
agreement as what should be done to right any wrongs
suffered. 174 The value conception view holds that values
distinguish restorative justice from traditional punitive
state justice.  In other words, a person committed to
value justice would not approve of a group of stakehold-
ers who meet and in the end decided to cane or incar-
cerate, because the value is placed on healing versus
punishment.175
The goal of a criminal justice system is to con-
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trol crime.  Many countries, including the united States,
use a retributive legal framework for the criminal justice
system.  Our current system focuses on controlling
crime, defined as an act against the state, through the
threat of punishment.  Proponents of restorative justice
argue that in our criminal justice system, we do not
focus on the actual harm done or on what the victim and
offender have experienced; rather, we focus on the act
of breaking the law.176 The result is that the focus on
crime in legal terms eliminates a focus on social and
moral issues.177 In a restorative justice system, crime is
defined as a conflict between individuals that results in
injury to the victim as well as to the community and the
offender.  Because the crime is considered an act against
both the individual and the community, “justice is de-
fined in terms of reparation and restoration.”178 The
community and the victim engage in the process of jus-




ment of both vic-
tims and offenders
is essential to the
process.  Victims’
direct participation
allows them to ac-
knowledge the im-
portance of what happened to them, and gives them
control over the outcome.  Offenders must take respon-
sibility for their actions and attempt to restore the rela-
tionships that are injured due to the criminal conduct.180
The participation of community members is essential,
because the offender may care more about their opinion
than the opinion of a criminal justice professional.181
historically, the term “retributive justice”
emerged to define the current criminal justice system,
and it was seen as a complete polarization to restorative
justice.  Conrad G. Brunk argues that on a theoretical
level, retribution and restoration are not the polar oppo-
sites that many might assume.182 he points out that the
commonality is the desire to vindicate by some type of
reciprocal action and some type of proportional relation-
ship between the criminal act and the response to it.
Where they differ is how to “even the score”.183
Challenges for Restorative Justice Programs
There are significant barriers to the adoption of
restorative justice principles in the united States.  Stud-
ies have shown that most Americans link lower crime
rates to increasing punitive policies.184 While there may
be a link between increasing punitive policies and drops
in the crime rate, many scholars believe that there are
other social factors, such as improvements in the econ-
omy and changes in the drug culture, that are mainly re-
sponsible for falling crime rates.185 Further, the media
has a heavy focus on crime and violence, and the polit-
ical system rewards candidates who indicate they are
“tough on crime.”  These things tend to increase public
fear of crime and strengthen the support for punitive
measures.186
Other challenges in bringing restorative justice
programs into the criminal justice system manifest
themselves as organizational or procedural challenges.
Most corrections agencies are not oriented toward grass-
roots participation and are generally hierarchical organ-
izations.187 Because restorative justice programs require
community support, the institutions interested in em-
bracing restorative justice practices must be committed
to community education and outreach.  Kay Pranis sug-
gests that one-page informational pieces, radio shows,
and local cable access are some of the venues to raise
community support and awareness.188 Pranis points out
that while the restorative justice movement has seen
many recent gains in awareness and interest, the broader
public policy trend around the nation is the expansion
of the prison system.  With resources being directed to-
wards incarceration, there is little remaining to focus on
working with victims and offenders in the community.189
The role of criminal justice professionals in the
restorative justice system is another area that requires
analysis.  In the current system, professionals have dis-
tinct, specialized roles.  In a restorative justice system,
however, people work together “holistically and flu-
idly,” making the specialized knowledge of profession-
als less necessary.190 At the least, the use of a restorative
justice system would significantly change the roles of
professionals in the system.191 Professionals would have
to be educated differently if they are to play a role in the
restorative justice process.  Generally, professionals in
the criminal justice system are not trained with regard
to the social, psychological, economic and planning dis-
ciplines related to victim and community reparation, as
well as community organizing and volunteer coordina-
tion.192 After researching and examining the emerging
role of professionals in two restorative justice programs,
Susan M. Olson and Albert W. Dzur concluded that pro-
fessionals must remain a part of the process, that the au-
thority and responsibility for the restorative justice
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The participation of
community members is
essential, because the of-
fender may care more
about their opinion than
the opinion of a criminal
justice professional.181
process should be shared between professionals and
community members, and that the need for the conven-
tional criminal justice procedure remains necessary.193
While a tough stance on crime may serve as a
roadblock for prosecutors to the implementation of
restorative justice programs, defense attorneys may also
serve as roadblocks.  Their participation may turn on
“whether they believe that redemption, forgiveness, and
conciliation are more important to their clients than the
ultimate resolution of the criminal charge.”194
Another question that poses a challenge for the
implementation of restorative justice programs is
whether restorative justice should act as a complement
to the existing court system or as a candidate to replace
it.  A realistic approach is to offer restorative justice pro-
grams as a tool in the tool box of options.195 Positioning
restorative justice as a complement to the traditional
criminal justice system is a point for gaining greater sys-
temic acceptance.196
Legal systems change slowly, and this may im-
pede the adoption of restorative justice within the crim-
inal justice system.197 Also, issues of constitutionality,
due process, legality, equality, presumption of innocence
and confidentiality must be considered.198
Another issue is how restorative justice pro-
grams will be held accountable.  Some argue that current
methods of accountability are not sufficient.  Zvi D.
Gabbay argues that the programs are asked to collect the
wrong data and that the supervision and evaluation of
the programs are inadequate.199 he argues that the pub-
lic has a right to know what these programs actually ac-
complish.200 Gabbay studied four programs that were
established and well integrated within the criminal jus-
tice system and had sustained a substantial number of
referrals each year.201 All four programs used evalua-
tions as a method of collecting information and all pro-
grams submitted reports to their funders.202 he
concluded that the data was collected from the wrong
individuals and it was not properly analyzed.203
Restorative Justice and Family Violence
Only recently has there been some openness to
considering the use of restorative justice methods in the
area of family violence.  A variety of restorative justice
models are currently being used throughout the world.
Those most commonly used in the context of domestic
violence are the victim-offender mediation, Family
Group Conferencing, community accountability boards,
restorative justice circles and victim impact panels.
Victim Offender Mediation
Victim-offender mediation, also referred to as
“victim-offender dialogue,” usually involves a victim,
an offender, and one or two mediators.  Sometimes the
mediation takes place through a third party who carries
information back and forth.204 In face-to-face meetings,
support persons for victims or offenders are present.205
A 1999 survey of victim offender mediation programs
in the united States indicates that support persons were
present in nine out of ten cases.206
The Surrogate Victim/Offender Dialogue Pro-
gram (“SVODP”) is used in Washington County, Ore-
gon.  In SVODP, victims meet with imprisoned
perpetrators of domestic violence with whom they have
had no relationship.207 The victims are carefully
screened to make sure that they are ready for the meet-
ing.208 The offenders are screened as well.  The offender
must have accepted responsibility for his actions, ex-
pressed a desire to make a change in his life, attended a
batterer’s treatment program, met with a counselor
about how he may become angry during the session, and
expressed a personal outcome for the session.209
Family Group Conferencing
Another model known as Family Group Confer-
encing (“FGC”) has been used in cases of child abuse
cases that include domestic violence.210 Time is spent
on safety planning and preparing the victim for the con-
ference, and the offender is encouraged to take respon-
sibility.211 The conference is attended by the victim, the
offender, and family and friends of both parties, as well
as institutional representatives.  The family meets alone
and develops a plan.  The plan is then approved by the
institutional representatives.212
Since 1989, two primary models of Family
Group Conferencing/Decision making have been prac-
ticed worldwide in the context of child welfare.  They
include Family Group Conferences and Family unity
Meetings.  The Family Group Conference model
(“FGC”) was developed and legislated in new Zealand
in 1989.213 The Family unity Model originated in Ore-
gon in 1990.214
FGC is a model that appeals to many restorative
justice advocates.  FGC involves the community of peo-
ple most affected by a crime—the victim and the of-
fender, and the family, friends, and key supporters of
both—in deciding the resolution of a criminal or delin-
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quent act.  The facilitator contacts the victim and of-
fender to explain the process and invites them to the
conference; the facilitator also asks them to identify key
members of their support systems who will be invited
to participate as well.  Participation by all involved is
voluntary.  The offender must admit to the offense in
order to participate.  The parties affected are brought to-
gether by a trained facilitator to discuss how they and
others have been harmed by the offense and how that
harm might be repaired.215
FGC has four key principles: (a) the process is
family centered and moves away from the negative per-
ceptions and a blame-placing approach to a strength-
based model; (b) respect and value is placed on cultural
ideals and practices; (c) family and community involve-
ment is encouraged; and (d) the community is seen as a
family support resource.216 FGC differs from the tradi-
tional model of victim-offender mediations programs in
that FGC uses public officials, police officers, probation
officers, and school officials rather than trained volun-
teers as facilitators.217 This allows for a more directed
facilitation.
The conference begins with the offender de-
scribing the incident, and then each participant describes
the impact of the incident on his or her life.  The of-
fender is faced with the human impact of his or her be-
havior on the victim, on those close to the victim, and
on the offender’s own family and friends.  The victim
has the opportunity to express feelings and ask questions
about the offense.  After the discussion, the victim is
asked to identify desired outcomes from the conference.
All participants may contribute to the determination of
how the offender will repair the harm he or she has
caused.  In the end, participants form an agreement out-
lining their expectations and commitments.218
Restorative Justice Circles
Restorative justice circles are often referred to
as “‘peacemaking circles,’ ‘restorative justice circles,’
‘repair of harm circles,’ and ‘sentencing circles.’”219
They differ from FGC in that the people asked to par-
ticipate are from a wider group of community members.
The process involves the use of a “talking piece” that is
passed around. 220
Circles are used by the Tubman Family Alliance
in Minnesota in certain domestic violence cases.  Gen-
erally, the victim, offender, family and friends of  both
the victim and offender, and members of the criminal
justice system are involved in the process.221 The group
decides what the sentence will be and what the offender
needs to do to repair the harm to the victim.222 Follow-
up meetings are held to oversee compliance with the
agreement reached.223 Twenty domestic violence cases
have been handled through the program and only 5% of
those offenders have re-offended.224
Victim Impact Panels
Victim impact panels are a collaboration be-
tween the court, batterer’s treatment programs, victim
advocates, and a restorative justice expert.225 These pan-
els involve victims talking to domestic violence offend-
ers, but they are not the offenders in the victim’s case.226
These panels have been expanded to include family
members, community members, law enforcement, busi-
ness leaders, and faith leaders.227 All panel members are
screened for appropriateness to participate in the panel.
This program is similar to FGC and the outcomes are
anticipated to be similar.228  
Research 
Some recent studies are encouraging.  The final
report on a project done by John Braithwaite and
Lawrence Sherman entitled “Reintegrative Shaming of
Violence, Drink Driving and Property Crime: a Ran-
domized Controlled Trial”, concluded that restorative
justice can work, and can even reduce crime by violent
offenders.229 The report describes findings on the recidi-
vism of offenders involved in the Canberra Reintegra-
tive Shaming experiments, which compared the effects
of standard court processes with the effects of a diver-
sionary conference in four kinds of cases: drunk driving
at any age, juvenile property offending with personal
victims, juvenile shoplifting offenses detected by store
security officers, and youth violent crimes.230 The vio-
lence cases excluded cases of family violence.
Across the four experiments that make up the
Reintegrative Shaming experiments project (“RISe”),
very different results have emerged for the different of-
fense categories.  In the youth violence experiment,
those offenders who were assigned to conference sub-
sequently offended at substantially lower levels—thirty-
eight fewer offenses per year per one-hundred
offenders—than did the offenders assigned to court.231
This was not true for any of the other experiments.232
The report recommended repeating the violence exper-
iment in many other venues and with more refined types
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of violent offenses, including robbery, assault and griev-
ous bodily harm.233 A susequent study conducted in
2000 replicated RISe in the context of juvenile offend-
ers and showed significant declines in re-offending rates
for juvenile offenders.234 This suggests that restorative
justice has wide-reaching possibilities for reducing re-
cidivism rates for even those who commit more violent
crimes.
Victim-Offender Mediation
Several victim-offender mediation studies reflect
that victim’s participation ranges from 40% to 60% and
in some cases rates as high as 90% have been reported.235
Coates, Burns and umbreit found that the victim’s rea-
sons for choosing to participate were,
in order of importance, to possibly
help the offender, to hear why the of-
fender did the crime, to communicate
to the offender the impact of the
crime, and to be sure the offender
would not return to commit a repeat
offense.236
A number of studies report sat-
isfaction on the part of both the victim
and the offender with the victim-of-
fender mediation process.237 eight or
nine out of ten participants report
being satisfied with the process and the final agree-
ment.238
Family Group Conferencing
Joan Pennel and Gale Burford argue that the out-
comes from the Family Group Decision Making Project
(“FGDMP”) reveal that FGC can be an effective strat-
egy for stopping child maltreatment and domestic vio-
lence.239 Over a one-year period thirty-two families took
part in the project.240 The referrals came from Child
Welfare, Adult Probation and Parole, and Youth Correc-
tions.  upon referral, family members engaged in exten-
sive pre-conferencing work with conference
coordinators to prepare all participants and to ensure the
safety of all participants.241 The actual conference had
four phases: first, the professionals outlined the ground
rules and the factual basis for the family’s participation;
second, the professionals outlined problems identified
and the services available to family members; third, the
family group was left alone to develop a plan to address
the problems; and fourth, the professionals reviewed the
plan to ensure that all the issues were addressed.242 I n
twenty-one of the thirty-two families, there was an adult
abusing an adult.  These families were followed for a
one to two year period after the conferencing and were
compared to thirty-one families in which child maltreat-
ment or domestic violence had occurred where the fam-
ilies did not participate in conferencing.  According to
Pennel and Burford, all of the data sources agreed that
in general FGC benefited the families, including but not
limited to a reduction of indicators of child abuse and
domestic violence.243 Incidents of violence in the fam-
ilies who participated in conferencing were cut in half,
and in contrast, violent events in the comparison group
rose.244 The results of this study point to the benefits of
FGC and address some of the concerns for victim safety
and controlling behaviors on the part of the offender.
The study also measured out-
comes that relate to beliefs about male
domination that may lead to domestic
violence and behaviors that reflect who
possesses the  power and controls in the
relationship.245 The study measured the
abuser’s domination of conversation
and control of economic resources.246
Participants revealed that domination
of the conversation was reduced from
four to two incidents post conference,
and control of economic resources was
reduced from four to zero incidents.247
The study also measured batterer’s minimization of vi-
olence, transference of responsibility for the violence to
the victim, and refusal to accept responsibility for the
abuse.  These incidents were reduced from eight to
three, while incidents in the comparison group increased
from four to six.248
In a meta-analysis covering both victim-offender
mediation and group conferencing programs in Canada,
Latimer, Dowden and Muise found that satisfaction rates
were somewhat higher in victim-offender mediation
than in group conferencing.  The authors felt that one
reason might be that conferences typically have more
people participating, making it more difficult to reach
satisfaction with the final agreement.249 A total of
twenty-two studies that examined the efficacy of thirty-
five restorative justice programs were included in the
meta-analysis.250 The results of the meta-analysis
demonstrated that a majority of victims and offenders
were more satisfied with restorative justice programs
than the traditional justice system, and that restitution
compliance was higher among those who participated
in the restorative justice program.251 Perhaps most im-
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Incidents of violence in
the families who partici-
pated in conferencing
were cut in half, and in
contrast, violent events
in the comparison group
rose.244
portant, the recidivism rates were lower among the
group in the restorative justice program.252
In 2007, The Smith Institute published a non-
governmental assessment by Sherman and Strang of the
evidence on restorative justice in the uK and interna-
tionally.253 Among the programs they commented on
was the “Dove Project,” which is an example of family
group conferencing being applied to cases of domestic
violence.254 This project, sponsored by the hampshire
County Council, has supported up to 600 conferences
per year.255 The project has demonstrated substantial re-
ductions in family violence relative to similar families
not participating in restorative justice programs.256
Restorative Justice Circles
Fewer studies have examined the success of
restorative justice circles.  Some research suggests that
the various types of circles have positively impacted
those who participate in them. 257 In Manitoba Canada,
the hollow Water First nation uses circles to work with
sex abuse victims and their victimizers.  These circles
were held with the offender and their families as well as
the victim and their families, community members and
representatives from the justice system.  Some partici-
pants reported benefiting immensely from the circle
process and having a stake in the justice outcomes,
while other cited negative aspects of the process as dif-
ficulty working with family and close friends, embar-
rassment and religious conflict.258
The healing Sentencing Circles Program in
Whitehorse, Yukon Territory report very high satisfac-
tion with participants for low-risk juvenile offenders.259
In South St. Paul, Minnesota the South Saint Paul
Restorative Justice Council has established a number of
types of circles for a variety of purposes.260 A study of
the program revealed that there was a high degree of sat-
isfaction with participants.261 The study indicated that
it might be difficult for the circles to process a high vol-
ume of people, however, the data gathered in the study
supports the contention that the circles had a positive
impact on those who participated.262
Special Challenges for Restorative Justice Pro-
grams in Domestic Violence Cases
The use of restorative justice principles in the
context of family violence presents special challenges.
The pitfalls derive from the inherent difficulty in bal-
ancing the interests of victims, offenders, the commu-
nity and the state.263 Victim safety is an immediate and
long-term issue that manifests itself differently from
other types of criminal cases.264 Further, family violence
cases usually involve a long-standing pattern of behav-
ior versus a single incident.265 The relationship between
the victim and the offender is almost by definition dif-
ferent from relationships in other types of cases and can
be expected to be ongoing.  The face-to-face concept of
community conferencing may create the opportunity for
further acts of violence against the victim.266
A family experiencing violence already has in-
appropriate family power dynamics and victims can eas-
ily be intimidated due to the imbalance of power that
already exists.267 Batterers may also intimidate or harm
those close to the victim; consequently, obtaining par-
ticipation from some stakeholders may be problematic.
Since isolation from family and friends is also a com-
mon dynamic, it may be difficult to find individuals to
participate in the process.268
There are many potential risks when an abuser
participates in a family group conference.  The survivor
may feel limited in what he or she can safely say, he or
she may give up trying to get what he or she wants or
need, he or she may agree to plans that he or she knows
will put him or her or the children in danger, the abuser
may manipulate the proceedings, and the abuser may re-
taliate after the family group conference.269 Conse-
quently, the victim may not be able to hold  his or her
own in the face-to-face meeting.
Restorative justice relies in part on a component
of therapeutic intervention with perpetrators.270 how-
ever, as discussed above, there is only some evidence
that batterer’s treatment programs are effective.271
Therefore, the question remains, if treatment of perpe-
trators is only moderately effective, why embrace an ap-
proach to intimate violence that relies in part on
treatment?272 
If some variation of the restorative justice prin-
cipals are to be applied in the family violence context,
what role should they play?  Some of the restorative jus-
tice literature promotes restorative justice as an alterna-
tive to the criminal justice system.273 Others argue that
community conferencing should be offered at an inter-
mediate stage in a hierarchy of responses with other
criminal justice processes and sanctions invoked where
conferencing fails.274 Pennell and Burford suggest a
process for family conferencing that intersects with the
formal legal intervention.275
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The most fundamental question at the root of
this problem is, how should society respond to criminal
behavior, particularly when the crime is committed
among those who see themselves as family?  This com-
plex question clearly requires a multifaceted response.
In order to permanently reduce the prevalence of family
violence, achieving the right combination of profes-
sional discretion, legal interventions, and restorative jus-
tice remedies is essential.276 The failure of three decades
of reform to change the prevalence of family violence
suggests that alternative approaches to the problem of
intimate violence need to be explored.277
In many contexts, the criminal justice system
seeks to protect the victim from all blame, especially in
cases of domestic violence.  The system assumes that
the only limited role the victim desires to play is in con-
victing and sentencing the offender.278 This assumption
results in the aggressive arrest and prosecution of of-
fenders even if the victim does not seek it.279
The preliminary evidence from the limited stud-
ies on restorative justice programs that address family
violence demonstrates that it may be more effective than
incarceration-based approaches.280 Domestic violence
and child protection response systems and the criminal
justice system frequently function independently and in
conflict with each other.281 Restorative justice practices,
in particular family group conferencing, provide both
systems with a cohesive, integrated approach.
The restorative justice movement is having an
increasing impact upon the criminal justice system
throughout the world.282 Programs throughout the
united States have found ways to integrate elements of
restorative justice into the current criminal justice sys-
tem and/or provide restorative justice alternatives with
positive results.283
The science of victimology supports the propo-
sition that expanding criminal justice systems to include
programs that restore victims provides new avenues for
fighting crime.284 Further, healing victims and offenders
offers the greatest potential for reducing recidivism
rates.285 Victims who participate in a criminal justice
process designed to restore are more satisfied with the
justice system overall.286 The data underscores the idea
that we need to revisit the conception of victims as pas-
sive and helpless to direct the justice process.287 One of
the primary strengths of restorative justice programs is
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programs.  If this were the case, the criminal justice sys-
tem would better serve both the victims and the profes-
sionals who work within the system.  Criminal justice
and restorative justice systems, when used in conjunc-
tion, can complement one another to punish and rehbil-
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the cycle of violence.289
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sary to protect the right of defendants, insulates both the
victim and the defendant from the very real human con-
tact that is often necessary.”290 exclusively looking at
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justice can get us closer.291 A realistic goal is to move
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lizing both the criminal justice and restorative justice
system.
Forgiveness has a place in criminal law.292 The
principles of restorative justice provide a background
for forgiveness to become a part of the criminal justice
system.293 There are challenges, but they can be over-
come if the professionals in the system are willing to ex-
plore alliances that cut across traditional boundaries.
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